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TH. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

13 June 1985

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

Herbert E. Meyer

VC/NIC

This is the territory I'll be covering on Saturday.

Herbert E. Meyer

Attachment

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TECHNOLOGY

I. The Soviet Vulnerability

- -- USSR cannot join in the Western revolution from industrial societies to knowledge-based societies.
- -- Knowledge-based societies are powered by free flow and application of data, a condition that no Communist societies can tolerate.
- -- Result is that USSR economy condemned to fall further and further behind Western economies; production in the USSR becomes less efficient relative to production in the West.

II. The US Opportunity

- -- President Reagan captured this when he proposed SDI, which he presented not as a gadget but rather as a strategy based on a recognition that we are entering an era in which defense will be cheaper than offense.
- -- SDI has both a strategic and a conventional aspect.
- -- SDI holds the promise of creating massive military and economic difficulties for the USSR.
- -- SDI holds the promise of pushing the US technology edge forward at a rate the Soviets could not possibly equal.
- -- SDI holds the promise of enabling our NATO allies to modernize their conventional forces quickly, effectively, and at an acceptable cost.

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- > -- SDI holds the promise of helping close the technology gap between the US and Western Europe which we are now coming to recognize as a major problem for the alliance.
- III. In the very broadest sense, there is a growing feeling that technology offers the US an opportunity to put itself and its allies irrevocably beyond the Soviet Union's grasp.